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Labour’s
first year
Roland Wales is an economist and former Labour Party Director of Policy.
A year after Labour came to power, it is a good time to measure the political performance of individual departments, and of the government as a whole, to assess whether the high expectations of May 1997 are being realised. Taking New Labour at face value, the government is judged on its energy and drive, on whether it means what it says, on its response to external events, and on its handling of the media. In measuring political performance, the question is: has the New Labour delivered on its promises? In the spirit of the new managerial culture in the public sector, the results of research are published as a league table of departments. The key yardsticks to assess the government are:
The primary purpose of the analysis is not "naming and shaming", but identifying problems and solving them. Two conclusions emerge:
Labour came to power in May 1997 with high hopes of using its unprecedented majority in the House of Commons, and deep wells of public support, to forge a new style of politics. High-flown rhetoric, the confidence of overwhelming victory, an opposition in disarray and a matchless ambition promised exciting political style and substance in the years ahead. Twelve months on, this pamphlet measures the political performance of individual ministries, and of the government as a whole, to assess whether the high expectations of last spring are being realised. This government, like others before it, has been a powerful advocate of testing, assessing and evaluating the performance of the public sector, most notably in local government, education and the Health Service. League tables in education are now well-established, and Audit Commission reports on local authorities are encouraging them to focus on particular measures to retain the confidence of government and the local electorate. As yet, however, there are no consistent measures of the government’s political performance, so it is in the spirit of the new managerial culture that some are offered here. Whether the government succeeds or fails by these criteria is just one indicator of success – others will judge from different standpoints. But the approach adopted here is intended to take New Labour at face value, and to judge it as it would have us judge it – on its energy and drive, on whether it means what it says, on its response to external events, and on its handling of the media. In measuring political performance, the simple question is: has the government delivered on its promises? What follows is an initial step in pursuit of a set of measurements that will answer this question, for ministers and government alike. Such an analysis may even prove useful to any Prime Minister contemplating a reshuffle. The five criteria used are those deemed to be most important to the present government. The best it can do is succeed on its own terms, the worst is to fail on the same basis. But the criteria chosen are also those to which any government might wish to aspire: delivering on its promises, consistency with its declared values, yet able to respond flexibly to events, and to bring the media and public along with it. Of course, there may be conflicts between these objectives: in responding to events, or in implementing its own policies, a government may have to tread an unpopular path. For that reason, more weight is given to ministers’ attempts to set the agenda – and to deliver on it – than to their handling of crises or of the media. Political success depends on delivering what people expect, in detail and with a view to the big picture, in good times and bad. If the government delivers, especially in the face of unwelcome shocks, it is unlikely that the press response will be unambiguously hostile, and, even if it were, it is unlikely that it would have much effect. While the criteria themselves may be justified in an objective sense, there is inevitably a good deal of subjectivity in assessing ministers’ success. Where possible, some quantification has been attempted, but the measurements used are clearly imperfect. Nevertheless, the more objective the measurement, the easier it will be to undertake the study in a consistent fashion in future years. Taking each criterion in turn, the key yardsticks are as follows: Drive and energy. How successful have ministers and their departments been in driving forward their legislative agendas? Table 1 shows the number of statements made by ministers in parliament, and also the Bills brought forward by each department. Of course, success in bringing forward legislation is not just a function of departmental or ministerial ability, but also of the government’s priorities as a whole. Nevertheless, even where there is no time in the government’s calendar for primary legislation on a subject, energetic ministers can ensure that detailed proposals are published and consulted on. For that reason Table 1 also shows White and Green Papers published. (1) Some attempt has also been made to allow for the size of ministries, and in particular the number of ministers associated with any department (shown in Table 2). Manifesto promises. The entire set of manifesto promises is set out in Table A1 (see Appendix), and departments are assessed on whether work has begun on meeting those commitments. Departments are not marked down for failing to deliver on promises at this early stage – although credit is given for those that have been fulfilled (2) – but in future years a more detailed assessment could be made of the extent to which promises are being kept. Departments are, however, marked down for implementing policies not contained in the manifesto. Nothing should have happened this early in the parliament to warrant a significant change in approach. Special emphasis is given to the five "early pledges", and to the commitments set out in Tony Blair’s "contract" in the manifesto. (3) Meeting New Labour’s values. This is the most difficult of the categories to judge, because Labour’s values embrace a diversity of outcomes. Nevertheless, some attempt has been made to judge how manifesto promises, and more specifically the way in which they are being implemented, accord with the party’s primary objectives. Flexibility. It is not only for the government as a whole, or individual ministers, to determine the success of the legislative programme. Governments are buffeted by many unexpected developments – some the result of external factors, others of their own making – and the ability to handle crises efficiently is an important ingredient of success. Public impact. Media coverage may not necessarily be an indicator of success in implementing a legislative programme, but judged by New Labour’s own standards, and the close relationship in its thinking between policy and presentation, no assessment of the government’s success would be complete without some examination of its media performance. This is discussed in greater detail in Bob Franklin’s Catalyst Paper (4), and so the assessment is restricted to an examination of departmental press activity, and the scale of coverage in four important quality newspapers (Table 4). The end result of the assessment is a departmental league table – a presentational technique which is very much in the spirit of the times. There are no benchmarks for previous years, so the results can best be seen as indicative of the strongest and weakest political performances of the past year. The overall government score also includes an assessment of the Prime Minister’s Office, to allow for the importance to the present administration of central co-ordination and presentation. Successful delivery of policies from idea to statute book demands energy and drive of departments and their ministers, as well as the ability to play the bureaucratic political game. Table 1 sets out the key information by which this criterion can be judged – Statements to the House, Bills progressed, White Papers and Green Papers published. Of course, the latter represent only the tip of the iceberg in terms of the efforts that ministers and departments take to make sure that their proposals are understood and discussed not only among the public as a whole, but also – and usually more importantly – among the interest groups with which they have most contact. At present, Labour seems willing to consult on the detail of many of its proposals, and has even gone as far as instituting a "Green Budget" to facilitate consultation on the state of the economy and some of the potential measures for future budgets. At the same time, the government has, in the past year, instituted more than 190 reviews, many with consultation processes (although also many without). (5) All of this takes a great deal of departmental effort, none of which can successfully be summarised and represented in Table 1. Bearing this caveat in mind, however, the table does suggest that certain departments and ministers have been more successful than others in delivering on their agenda Table 1. Delivering on the Agenda is only available in the PDF version. The busiest department has undoubtedly been John Prescott’s Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR), which hit the ground running with the Bill to release capital receipts, and quickly followed up with the Green Paper on London. Since then there has been a string of legislation, Green and White papers on a wide range of subjects, and a sequence of important statements in the House. It is not entirely surprising that the department should have been so productive, given that it now embraces what were previously two departments, and has a complement of nine ministers (see Table 2). Table 2 Number of Departmental Ministers
* Includes 0.5 of Lord Simon. The most active in legislative terms has been the Home Office, which has responsibility for 5.5 Bills (the Bill on the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights being shared with the Lord Chancellor’s Office). The Home Secretary, Jack Straw, has also been assiduous in bringing Statements to the House (though not always on issues of immediately pressing concern), which earns extra marks for determination to press the pace of reform and maintain a high profile. The impressive scale of Home Office activity is also apparent in the three White Papers it has produced, as well as in a range of consultation papers. Of course, with six ministers in the department, a considerable volume of policy work undertaken before the election, and crime and justice an important element in the government’s campaigning strategy, the legislative productivity of the Home Office is not entirely surprising. Even so, that productivity is put in the shade by the efforts of Lord Irvine and the Lord Chancellor’s Office. Despite having only two ministers, one of whom is apparently involved in running most other aspects of government, it has been responsible for a great deal of legislation and a range of consultation papers on important topics, particularly access to justice. Next most active, in legislative terms, has been Margaret Beckett’s Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), which also has a large ministerial complement. It has been responsible for five Bills in the past year, two of which – on competition and the National Minimum Wage – were highly contentious. There have also been important recent Green Papers on company law and regulation of utilities, and the promise of an imminent White Paper on another contentious issue, namely rights at work. Curiously, there have been no statements from the department – indeed there were complaints from the opposition in 1997 about the absence of the President of the Board of Trade from the Commons. The only other member of the Cabinet to have made no statements to the House is the Secretary of State for Social Security, Harriet Harman, although two statements – on uprating, and the fundamental welfare review – have been made by her junior ministers. The burden of the Department for Social Security (DSS) has been very light for a department with six ministers – only one Bill piloted through the house, and two Green Papers (admittedly on complex topics). The DSS’s lack of productivity is highlighted by the energetic performance of other departments with similar numbers of ministers. The Treasury (HMT), for example, has a ministerial complement which is much the same, yet has been responsible for two Budgets and associated Finance Bills, for another major Bill (on the Bank of England), and for important consultative initiatives on a range of economic and financial matters. At the same time, the Education and Employment Department, which overlaps with the DSS on many issues, and again is only slightly larger (with seven, rather than six ministers) has managed to take four Bills through the House, some very detailed, and one almost immediately on being elected. There has also been an important White Paper, and a clutch of Green Papers on politically influential topics, such as lifelong learning, and further and higher education. By contrast, the Department of Health has had a relatively light legislative agenda (a single Bill aimed at enabling Trusts to participate in Private Finance Initiative ventures), but the Secretary of State, Frank Dobson, has ensured a regular supply of Statements to the House to maintain his profile and set the agenda on a range of health issues. Indeed, only the Prime Minister himself has matched the Health Secretary in making Statements to the House. Two other departments merit special mention for ensuring rapid progression of their legislative agenda. The Scottish and Welsh Offices have ensured the progressions of Bills on their respective referenda, following up with White Papers on the detail of the devolution proposals, and now Bills based on those White Papers. In addition, and with relatively limited numbers of ministers (particularly in Wales), they have followed initiatives in other departments (especially education and health) with Scottish and Welsh equivalents, while at the same time addressing a range of other pressing issues (especially in Scotland, as can be seen from the cited Green Papers). The Northern Ireland Office has also made progress in both legislation and consultation, despite the heavy burden of the peace talks. Among the other departments, the Foreign Office, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF), and the Ministry for Culture, Media and Sport have undertaken relatively light legislative loads, with broadly similar ministerial complements. The least burdened departments of all have been the remaining three – Defence, Cabinet Office and International Development. Defence, in particular, has managed just one Statement in the House (on Bosnia), and as yet not published its Defence Review. The consultations on the review are presumably extensive enough to occupy the efforts of four ministers for the entire year. Table 1 summarised how the departments have set about giving effect to their manifesto commitments. Table A1 (see Appendix) shows those commitments in daunting detail: 150 specified promises, ranging from the most general – "Ensure stable economic growth and low inflation" – to the highly specific – "End the sell-off of school playing fields". In terms of sheer numbers of commitments, DETR outreaches all the other departments, with Education, Treasury and Home Office not too far behind. Thereafter, Health, DTI and DSS are broadly comparable, with Culture just a little way behind. The remaining departments are restricted to no more than a handful of commitments among them. This is not to say, however, that the agenda for, say, Scotland and Wales, is restricted only to the referendum and the enactment of the devolution proposals. In practice each department is also charged with delivering on a wide range of other issues set out in specific manifestos for Scotland and Wales, and including issues such as the handling of quangos, the appropriate allocation of expenditure, the organisation of specific areas of administration and so on. But this is true of all other departments as well. Labour produced volumes of policy proposals prior to the election, with long, detailed documents explaining its thinking in every area of government. But to itemise all of these promises would be unwieldy. Instead, only the main manifesto is considered, because it encompasses the highest priority proposals, judged across the full range of government activities. The government has made an energetic start in implementing its manifesto. The area of most conspicuous success is clearly Northern Ireland, where the peace talks have been driven, within an ambitious timetable, to a successfully negotiated settlement. The Northern Ireland Office has also been responsible for legislation on a number of contentious areas, notably in dealing with police and parades. There are other areas, however, where important confidence-building work has yet to be fully developed – tackling discrimination, for example, or fostering greater economic development – but the success of the peace process so far is worth celebrating. Manifesto promises on Scotland and Wales are also well on their way to delivery. In both cases successful referendum outcomes (from the government’s perspective) have been followed rapidly by detailed legislation to give effect to devolution promises. In neither case, however, has the passage been without incident. The Welsh Office saw the proposals survive with only the narrowest of margins – which can hardly be counted a political success – while the prospect of equal numbers of male and female representatives in the Scottish Parliament has begun to fade, in contrast with New Labour’s implicit election commitment. Among the larger departments, the performance of the Home Office stands out for the range of its activities, and the speed with which it has begun its programme of reform. One of the earliest pieces of legislation introduced by the government was the ban on handguns. The ending of the primary purpose rule for immigration was also introduced quickly, to the surprise of many who had lobbied for it, but had become sceptical due to government rhetoric on immigration matters. The White Paper on youth crime set out in detail the proposals for meeting a number of New Labour’s manifesto commitments, and many of Labour’s other promises on tackling crime and social misbehaviour are set out in the Crime and Disorder Bill. In other areas, the Home Office has successfully piloted reform of the voting system for European elections, and is actively pursuing the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights. While noting the speed and zeal with which the Home Office has acted, the downside of such rapid progress on so many fronts is the problem of ensuring that legislation is thoroughly tested before being laid before parliament. Some of the proposals being introduced have authoritarian elements which have the effect of blurring the boundaries between civil and criminal law, and which could cause serious problems if not adequately monitored and controlled. The Home Office has proved much more decisive in fulfilling promises than the equally busy Lord Chancellor’s Office. Pre-election pledges on reform of the judiciary appear to have been cast aside, and the proposals brought forward on legal aid were widely condemned, and have since been re-thought. The breadth of Lord Irvine’s involvement across government may well restrict his ability to press ahead with the necessary task of widening access to a fair and efficient judicial system. The task is a necessary one, however, given that the implementation of many of New Labour’s policies relating to individual rights is likely to increase the use of the courts as a means of redress. The department embracing the widest sphere of activities – the DETR – has also made a rapid start to implementation across its entire range. It has succeeded in piloting the new government for London proposals, and the referendum to decide their fate, although unfortunately at the expense of allowing Londoners the opportunity to choose between a mayor and an assembly separately, or to have a say in the balance of power between the two, or to consider the possibility of tax-raising powers. Legislation has also been brought forward on Regional Development Agencies, while a White Paper set out an extensive array of proposals for enhancing regional development. Less highly visible, but equally energetic, has been the work undertaken with local authorities. The calculation of the Standard Spending Assessment has already been reviewed, and local authorities have been given the power both to engage in PFI contracts and to utilise receipts from the sale of council houses. At the same time, the shift away from competitive tendering, towards a "best value" basis has already been piloted across 36 local authorities. Abolition of capping is not yet on the agenda, however, and is awaiting implementation of companion policies designed to strengthen local democracy. In environmental matters, the Kyoto conference proved a success for the British approach (although delivering less in total than Labour had promised for the UK), and proposals have been made on issues such as planning and access to the countryside. While the government’s attitude to ensuring greater access has led to questions about the strength of its commitment to the issue, close inspection of the manifesto reveals that the promise was less than forthright in the first place. (6) And although the Environmental Audit Committee in parliament has been established, it is less clear that the government has been successful in encouraging all departments to adopt an environmental perspective in their thinking. With such a wide-ranging department, it is inevitable that some areas will progress more slowly than others. Housing and transport do not show the same signs of urgency as other parts of the department’s portfolio. This is particularly surprising in the case of transport, given its status as an element of the 10-point contract. The department has issued proposals for London Underground, however, and while they may be consistent with the letter of the manifesto promise to ensure a "public/private partnership", they are likely to prove costlier in the long run than providing public sector finance. Other departments assessed at the same level as the DETR include the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Defence. Both were quick to begin work on their highest profile undertakings – the Strategic Defence Review by the latter, the Social Chapter, GCHQ rights and the banning of landmine use and production by the former. The Defence Review is, of course, less complete than might have been wished, excluding, as it does, consideration of Trident and the Eurofighter. The publication of the Foreign Office Mission Statement also attracted much favourable attention and comment, although developments since, especially regarding arms sales to regimes with dubious human rights records, have taken some of the gloss off the policy. Although by its very creation, the new Department for International Development fulfilled a manifesto commitment, its first year has not been particularly auspicious, marred in particular by its fumbles over Montserrat. On the other hand, the White Paper on world poverty is ambitious, and much of the work being done on debt relief may prove of great value in the long run. Nevertheless, Labour has made no further progress on meeting one of its key promises in this area – namely the commitment to the UN aid target. In fact, the government’s self-imposed spending restrictions have produced no more than a modest increase in nominal terms in the aid budget this year – and therefore a decline as a proportion of GDP, making the aid target even less of a realisable goal. Money – or the lack of it – is at the heart of difficulties in other ministries as well. In Education and Employment (DfEE), for example, there has been a flood of documents and legislation intended to raise educational attainment – and simultaneously increasing the degree of centralised power – but the additional funds required to give swift effect to Labour’s manifesto promises have not been forthcoming on the required scale. As a result, there has been only slow progress in reducing class sizes, although the speed with which the Assisted Places Scheme was abolished was impressive. A lack of funding is also at the heart of New Labour’s decision to introduce tuition fees – a decision which is the more unwelcome for coming so quickly after the election, and for not being raised in the manifesto, although there was plenty of opportunity alongside the references to Labour’s view on student maintenance. There is also likely to be little progress in providing access to high quality training without funding, and it is difficult to see how the department can deliver lifelong learning effectively in the absence of resources. Health, too, requires additional resources if the key pledge on reducing waiting lists is to be realised. As in Education, however, it is clear that the minister and the department are determined to deliver as quickly as possible on those pledges which do not require additional resources. Trusts have already been empowered to enter into PFI contracts, a Royal Commission on long-term care has been established, and steps have been taken to expand locality commissioning and to promote public health issues through the appointment of a new minister. It is unfortunate that the impetus of this was blunted by New Labour’s about-turn on tobacco advertising, and on its reluctance to set more ambitious public health targets. The other major department affected by the government’s fiscal caution is the DSS, which was badly snared on lone-parent benefit cuts, and has been severely restricted by the Treasury in drawing up its Green Paper. Some detailed aspects of policy have been successfully implemented or promoted – tackling fraud, for example, or promoting access to childcare (which still falls well short of the promised "national childcare strategy", but at least makes a step in the right direction). At this stage, the Green Paper is too vague to tell us how the welfare reforms will work in practice, but without additional funding it is unlikely that the desire to extend second-tier pension provision will succeed, especially for those on low or no incomes, for whom the "citizen’s pension" is promised. The department responsible for inhibiting progress elsewhere is the Treasury, which has nevertheless been successful in bringing forward a number of its own planned reforms – the spending review, review of the tax/benefit system, reforms to corporate and capital gains tax, the windfall levy, the cut in VAT on fuel, a redistributive Budget and others. Against that, however, are ranged less successful initiatives: the introduction of Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs) was badly thought through, and subsequently amended; the 10p starting rate of tax has yet to appear; and the welcome cuts in marginal tax rates for low-paid workers have to be set against the increase in marginal tax rates of those just above the poverty threshold. The most dramatic Treasury gestures were those implemented almost as soon as the government took office, yet which were not promised in the manifesto. Giving operational independence to the Bank of England was certainly consistent with the principles for reform set out in Labour’s manifesto, (7) but clearly went beyond both its letter and spirit. There must be a significant question-mark over any major policy introduced without warning within four days of an election, and such a dramatic constitutional change clearly required deeper and wider consideration. The same is true of the reforms to financial regulation which followed quickly thereafter. The DTI has moved forward steadily on some parts of its challenging programme. The promise to bring forward competition legislation as an early priority has been met by the current Competition Bill, while the Low Pay Commission has been busily working on agreeing the minimum wage that is currently being enacted through legislation. In the background, negotiations continue over various aspects of rights at work, with the promise of legislation in the next session. Less progress has been made on regulation than might have been expected, given its central importance to so many industries. Likewise, small firms may have to wait longer for the statutory right to interest on late payment of debt than they might have imagined when they read the manifesto. Other departments with close industry links have fared less well than the DTI. MAFF continues to be dogged by the BSE crisis, although at least one of the indirect results – the establishment of a Food Standards Agency – is being pursued in the face of opposition from food industry interests. The Ministry for Culture has likewise faced discontent among the ranks of various artistic constituencies and creative industries, and has been unable to offer any significant palliatives. On the other hand, the Millennium Dome continues to press ahead in the face of hostility from some, and apathy from most. Surprisingly, given new Labour’s capacity for rhetorical flourish and grandness of vision, the Dome received not a word in the manifesto. Finally, only two cheers for the Cabinet Office, charged with introducing a Freedom of Information Bill, but tangling in bureaucratic procedure with a range of opponents. Given the hostility from some ministers and civil servants, it is surprising that the White Paper has come out at all, but given that this was once one of New Labour’s foremost priorities, it might have been expected that the case would have been pressed more rapidly and radically than it has been to date. How closely do New Labour’s promises, and its actions to date, correspond with its own declared values? In 1995 the Labour Party replaced Clause IV of its constitution with a new clause, designed to promote a more modern image, and to discard Labour’s long-standing commitment (honoured more in the breach) to public ownership. The new clause has a preamble which sets out its fundamental objectives: "The Labour Party is a democratic socialist party. It believes that by the strength of our common endeavour we achieve more than we achieve alone, so as to create for each of us the means to realise our true potential and for all of us a community in which power, wealth and opportunity are in the hands of the many, not the few, where the rights we enjoy reflect the duties we owe, and where we live together, freely, in a spirit of solidarity , tolerance and respect." It then moves on to describe the means by which these objects will be realised, and in particular the creation of a:
It is against these criteria in particular that New Labour’s progress must be judged. Inevitably, progress towards meeting underlying values is likely to be far slower than in delivering manifesto promises. The establishment of devolved authorities in Scotland and Wales, for example, represents a considerable success in manifesto terms, but the extent to which either succeeds in creating a truly open democracy will depend on the manner in which both institutions, and the process of government in both countries, is managed in the future. Thus far, New Labour’s approach to governance offers a paradox – the willingness to create decentralised structures, combined with a highly centralised model of decision-making. For most Cabinet ministers, the autonomy to act on individual issues is strictly limited. Even in parliament, Labour’s large majority has resulted in a shift in attitude towards the principle of representation, with members encouraged, on a regular basis, to represent the party in their constituency, rather than their constituency in parliament. (8) At the same time, an increased reliance on various forms of direct opinion assessment offers the government the opportunity to claim that its approach reflects public opinion, while limiting the scrutiny of such claims. (9) Any attempts to extend representative democracy, if they are to correspond with New Labour’s own values, should be directed towards encouraging the participation of groups which are presently excluded, rather than enhancing the power of those whose views are already well represented. The downgrading of the role of representative democracy, and of the role played by individual representatives, is echoed in the reforms to the voting system in European elections: the move towards a proportional system is welcome, but the Home Secretary’s decision to opt for the closed list system, and the way in which that system has been implemented by the Labour Party itself with regard to the selection of candidates, will act to increase centralised control. Similar concerns surround initial attempts to reform local government. There is little doubt that participation in local elections, and identification with local councils, is too low. It may also be true that the introduction of directly elected mayors will increase participation in elections. Nevertheless, it is likely that these new model mayors, with their powerful, individual offices staffed by appointees rather than elected officials, will diminish the power of local authorities, and thus restrict the democratic mandate, rather than widen it. It is instructive that, in all the discussion of candidates for London’s new mayor, there is no mention of any existing council leaders. Indeed, Ken Livingstone – the only one of the widely canvassed candidates who has any relevant experience – is the one who is widely regarded as the Labour leadership’s least preferred candidate. Labour has begun to address the unrepresentative nature of quangos by widening the range of their membership, including representatives of local communities and a greater breadth of political affiliation. Some of the responsibility of ensuring greater democratic scrutiny will, in the future, fall to regional chambers, the Parliament in Scotland and the Assembly in Wales, but it seems unlikely that there will be any significant extension of democracy into areas of quango-based control. The delay in implementing the Freedom of Information legislation, and the leaked suggestions of behind-the-scenes attempts to reduce its scope are also suggestive of government’s reluctance to pass on much of its newly acquired power. Progress towards a more dynamic economy has also been limited, but some steps have been taken to ensure greater participation in the labour market – through the New Deal and other Welfare to Work initiatives – and a more dynamic investment culture through reform of corporate and capital gains tax. There has also been some attempt to redistribute resources to poorer families. Efforts to tackle gross inequality – through the provision of higher benefits, for example, or further attempts to reform the tax/benefit system at the lower end of the income distribution – may be severely hampered by Labour’s efforts to chain itself to the mast of fiscal prudence (as promised at the last election) through fixed income tax rates and implementation of pre-existing spending plans. Whether the reform of the Bank of England will prove an aid to development of a dynamic economy remains to be seen. For the moment it is likely that the increase in interest rates will act to constrain the more dynamic and productive sectors of the economy – notably manufacturing – and to restrict investment. At the same time, the failure adequately to tackle the growth of consumer expenditure may prolong the period of higher interest rates, and inhibit the progress of some of the structural measures designed to enhance the economy’s productive capacity. New Labour’s commitment to a just society can combine with its view of a dynamic economy only where security at work permits individuals to adapt with confidence to changing circumstances, and to undertake the range of commitments designed to improve their conditions in the longer-term – training, for example, or financial commitments such as mortgages or pensions. Labour’s review of the welfare state gives few real clues as to the development of its thinking on some of these important issues. The Green Paper on Welfare Reform is vague on the extent to which individuals will be required to make their own pension arrangements – whether voluntarily or compulsorily. The apparent changes in the National Insurance scheme, and its possible absorption into the tax system also raise questions about the scope for social insurance in the future, and the extent to which the government wishes to encourage individual provision. The uncertainty arising out of the review is also likely to hinder financial planning in the longer run. The ability to enter into long-standing commitments is also influenced by the protection offered to those in employment, whether against unfair dismissal, discrimination or exploitation. As in other areas of New Labour’s thinking, the longer-term direction of its plans is unclear. Whereas Labour in the past might have been expected to reinforce protection for workers individually and collectively, the progress of the White Paper on rights at work, the conflict over the implementation of the Working Hours Directive and the close links forged between New Labour and the business community raise questions about the future direction of reform. To date, only accession to the Social Chapter indicates a willingness to underscore the need for better and fairer conditions at work. New Labour’s initial attempts at "redistributing opportunity" are focused on the New Deal, which represents a useful start, but which will only prove truly successful if those offered help receive permanent positions at the end of their six-month placement. The strong element of compulsion, if over-emphatically applied, may also result in inappropriate placements, to the detriment of people’s longer-term potential. Ultimately, the New Deal, and other schemes designed to help the long-term unemployed back into the labour market, will only succeed if sufficient new jobs are created, and if the skills and experience that people acquire can be put to further use. At this stage it is clearly too early to say whether this is likely, but the prospect of a significant increase in employment is difficult to imagine, given the high rate of participation already in the UK, and the impact of higher interest and exchange rates. The New Deal is at least promising in one of its elements – namely the desire to offer training to all involved. Again, however, the impact of the scheme will depend on the scale and content of that training. The same is true of efforts to improve training and education more generally, where shortage of funds may inhibit individual efforts at advancement. The emphasis on loans for student maintenance, and the introduction of tuition fees in higher education, will inevitably act to restrict access, and may well prevent talented but impoverished young people from climbing the ladder of educational opportunity. New Labour’s efforts to enhance the performance of all schools will help to offer opportunity to many of those currently denied it, and the abolition of the Assisted Places Scheme to fund smaller class sizes for infants in state schools is wholly in keeping with the party’s values. As yet, however, the government appears disinclined to tackle the entrenchment of privilege in private schools, or the two-tier systems in areas which continue to permit selection, by ability or any other criteria. As long as parents believe they can purchase educational advantage for their children, significant barriers to equalisation of opportunity will persist. While important aspects of our two-tier education system may yet remain, in the Health Service there have been attempts to address one of the most significant causes of two-tier access to healthcare – the relatively privileged treatment of the patients of GP fundholders. There has also been welcome recognition that inequalities in health arise from inequality in income and wealth. Less welcome, however, is the narrowing of focus in public health targets, which, if more attainable, are also less ambitious. New Labour’s objectives lay stress on the need for a healthy environment, and the manifesto interprets this as a commitment to put the environment at the heart of government. To date, however, environmental measures have been relatively sparse – the decision to lower VAT on energy-saving home improvements, the continuing rise in fuel duty and the differential road tax on smaller cars are obvious examples – while others (such as the decision to cut VAT on fuel) are likely to act in the opposite direction. Nevertheless, it is clear that Labour’s performance to date has done little to meet the objective it has set itself. Real progress will have to await the development and financing of an integrated transport policy, and a willingness to grasp the nettle of environmental taxation. In the international sphere, New Labour has been truer to its underlying purposes. In Europe, in the Commonwealth and in the G8, Labour has attempted to play a leading role, even if, at times, its ethical foreign policy has been attacked as inconsistent. In defence, too, it is clear that the review which is currently underway represents a more broadly based strategy to establish defence requirements, recognising in particular the importance of issues such as conflict prevention and resolution. The "foreign policy perspective" which motivates the review entails a more holistic approach to international problems than has commonly been associated with defence in the past. New Labour’s ambitions in the area of International Development, as revealed by the White Paper and its energetic role in debt relief discussion, are entirely consistent with its values – and while it may not score highly for implementation, it cannot be faulted for intent. Implementing a challenging and extensive programme of reform is difficult enough in ordinary circumstances, but is complicated by the sudden onset of unexpected crises. Some are entirely outside the government’s control, others may be a result of its own errors. To succeed in implementing its own agenda, the government has to have the flexibility and strength of purpose to cope with the former, while having the foresight and judgement to minimise the latter. In this section, temporary media squalls which have no bearing on policy development or implementation are excluded, but the ability to negotiate successfully, and to reconcile conflicting opinions to maintain progress towards specified ends, is included. Fleetness of foot is an invaluable commodity in both ministers and departments. Table 3 sets out the most important hazards that the government has had to negotiate in the past year, classified by source – external or internal – and by how it was handled. A cursory glance suggests that ministers have generally displayed great flexibility in dealing with external shocks or negotiations. Northern Ireland stands out, for example, while the negotiations in Kyoto and Amsterdam were also handled successfully. The Foreign Office has had other successes too, together with the Ministry of Defence, especially in handling the Gulf crisis and growing tensions in the Balkans. Most of the government’s difficulties have been self-inflicted. One of the most serious was the rebellion on lone-parent benefits. Despite numerous warnings – coded and overt – from backbenchers, a combination of the DSS, HMT and No 10 conspired to ensure that there was no flexibility over an issue of a relatively minor nature. As a result, the government discouraged many of its supporters, spread alarm among disabled people, and embarked on a pointless and time-consuming roadshow to spread a message about welfare reform that barely featured in the manifesto, or the Queen’s Speech. Some flexibility at an earlier stage could have allowed the government to proceed on a consensual basis with a welfare reform package, but having now raised the stakes it has given itself a much more difficult job. Table 3. Flexibility
Another problem issue has been tobacco sponsorship, which was badly handled by the Prime Minister’s media advisers, and has left a residual feeling that the government may be susceptible to persuasion by successful, wealthy businessmen. The recent controversies over the relationship between Tony Blair and media baron Rupert Murdoch may have been given added momentum by such perceptions. Not all responses to "internal" political difficulties have been badly handled however. One instance of an effective response to a sudden political problem comes from the Ministry for Culture, which, within hours of the returned verdict in the G-Tech libel case, had ensured an acceptable, agreed position with the departing lottery regulator. As a model for dealing with such issues, it was considerably better than its own performance just a year earlier when it emerged empty-handed after confronting the Camelot board over excessive remuneration packages. Politicians and civil servants should recognise the limits of their power, and keep within them if they wish to retain their credibility. Our final criterion is public impact. A successful minister and department must ensure a satisfactory profile, both in terms of quality and quantity. It is fair to say that this has been one of New Labour’s poorest areas of performance in its first year in government, which is surprising given that it prides itself on its media manipulation skills. The qualitative issues are dealt with more fully in Bob Franklin’s pamphlet (10), so examination is here confined to quantitative measures. Table 4 shows the number of occasions between 1 May 1997 and 31 March 1998 that Cabinet ministers featured prominently in four important quality newspapers – the Financial Times (which we classify as broadly politically neutral, although with an obvious business and financial bias), the Independent (sympathetic to the government), and the Times and Sunday Times (broadly unsympathetic). As an indicator of departmental initiatives, an additional column shows the number of news releases issued between 1 May 1997 and 8 April 1998 (the beginning of the Easter parliamentary recess). The most striking – if unsurprising – result is the undoubted pre-eminence of the Prime Minister, with almost twice as many hits in the Independent and Times as the next nearest Cabinet member (Chancellor Gordon Brown). Not surprisingly, his advantage over the Chancellor was less in the Financial Times, although nevertheless still significant. Table 4. Public profile
Departmental news releases have not been included for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, since the range of these departments’ activities results in a significantly greater volume of releases not strictly comparable with others. Taking the Prime Minister and the Chancellor together, the number of hits was greater than the rest of the Cabinet taken together, clearly highlighting the extent to which the government is seen to be heavily dependent on just two big players. After the Chancellor, the two other members of the so-called "big four" (Robin Cook and John Prescott) are clearly well ahead, in total, of the next strongest performer, Jack Straw. Prescott’s department, with its wide range, clearly works hard to advertise its many initiatives, but Cook’s score has undoubtedly been boosted by stories about his personal life. Prescott has also suffered some intrusion, with the publicity attending the business activities of his son, and problems in his Hull constituency. Straw saw his tally raised because of publicity surrounding his son’s involvement with cannabis. After these five, the next most cited Labour politician is Peter Mandelson. Thereafter, the list of remaining Cabinet members is topped by the Culture Secretary Chris Smith – mainly reflecting the series of problems surrounding the National Lottery. The business content can be seen from the fact that he outscores even the Home Secretary in the Financial Times. He in turn is outscored there by the President of the Board of Trade, Margaret Beckett, whose DTI tops the list of news releases, just ahead of the expansive DETR. Around the 250–350 mark are a clutch of ministers in high profile departments, including Education (David Blunkett), Health (Frank Dobson), and Social Security (Harriet Harman). The energy of the DfEE cannot be faulted, with over 500 news releases in less than a year. The Department of Health also appears to have generated an impressive number of initiatives, despite a relatively light legislative load. One curiosity in the DSS is the higher score in the Financial Times analysis for Frank Field than for his boss, perhaps reflecting the importance of the future design of the welfare state to many large providers of private insurance and pensions. Unusually, the Northern Ireland Secretary (Mo Mowlam) and the Lord Chancellor (Lord Irvine) both appear high in the press rankings, the former largely due to the peace talks, the latter because of his undoubted prominence in government, and his talents in the field of interior design. The relatively low profile of the remaining ministers can be explained in a number of ways – such as their regional perspective (Donald Dewar and Ron Davies), the ongoing process of review (George Robertson), or the relatively specialised nature of the subject (Clare Short). Three aspects stand out, however. The first is the disparity in the performance of the Scottish and Welsh Secretaries (with the latter one of only two Cabinet ministers with fewer than 100 hits, which is all the more surprising in view of the newsworthiness of the close-run devolution referendum). (11) Next is the surprisingly poor performance of the Agriculture Secretary Jack Cunningham (especially in view of the volume of news releases, which no doubt feature heavily in the agricultural trade press), although the business aspects of the BSE issue are reflected in the fact that he scored eighth in the Financial Times analysis, but only 12th overall. Third is the remarkably low profile of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (David Clark) who, despite handling the Freedom of Information White Paper (an issue that might be thought to be close to the hearts of newspaper editors) barely troubled the scorers. Bringing the scores together reveals some surprising performances, but also some easily predicted successes and failures. Heading the lists are the DETR and the Northern Ireland Office, while the DSS and the Cabinet Office look destined for relegation. By and large, those departments that have performed best are those that have been most energetic – which reflects the fact that three of the five criteria are linked in some way to the ability of departments to deliver. The most notable exception is the Lord Chancellor’s Office, which, while scoring high on drive and energy has performed poorly in other areas. Table 5. Labour’s first year in power – departmental assessment
After the top two departments come the Department of Health and the Home Office. Both score well on drive, with the former sharing success in delivering on Labour’s values, and the latter on media presentation. The Prime Minister’s Office is ranked alongside these strong performers, in reflection of its energy and delivery, and despite a poor performance on flexibility. The other ministries with an above average performance are the HMT, the Scottish Office, the DfEE, the FCO and the DTI. The HMT and the DfEE scored particularly well for drive, while the FCO was equal top of the rankings for flexibility. The DTI performed fairly well across all categories. The two departments just below average performance – the Welsh Office and the Ministry for Culture – each had slight areas of weakness, without any obvious offsetting strengths, although both are well placed for improvement next year. Next come five underperformers with highly variable ratings across the five criteria. International Development, for example, does well on attempting to meet New Labour’s promises and values, but is hindered by poor drive and flexibility. MAFF, by contrast, scored quite well on flexibility, but poorly on drive and media. Nevertheless, all five are quite a way ahead of the poorest performer, the DSS, which failed to score well in any category. Its output has been poor, it has been responsible for some of the most difficult moments of the government’s first year, it has been plagued by continual speculation about rifts within it, and with other ministries, and it has failed to set out a coherent vision of New Labour’s welfare intentions. For the DSS, it seems, things can only get better. In this pamphlet departmental political performance has been graded on a number of criteria which the government, by its own philosophy, regards as paramount. It is easy to take issue with particular judgements in specific areas, but assessed on all 85 scores across criteria and departments, the overall rankings are unlikely to change much: some departments (DETR, Northern Ireland, Home Office and Health) have been notably more productive and successful than others. The government as a whole has scored best on drive, and worst on delivering New Labour’s values. The primary purpose of such an analysis, however, is not "naming and shaming" – which is always a policy of dubious purpose and effect – but identifying problems and solving them. With that constructive end in mind, here are two conclusions:
The government’s relatively poor performance on delivering on its values, and its low scores for media handling and flexibility, may be symptoms of a deeper problem. At the heart of New Labour’s approach lies a constant contradiction: between collectivism and individualism; between accepting society as it is, or wanting to change it; between redistribution and the status quo. The fault line runs so deep that it is becoming difficult to anticipate how the government is likely to react to particular problems. As a result, when issues arise there is confusion within government and beyond, a constant jockeying for position, both personal and political. Without clarity of purpose, the government’s confusion – actual and perceived – is likely to deepen. By linking its programme and its actions more explicitly to its underlying values the government can dispel that confusion, and emphasise its direction and its purpose. If it does not, it may lose the public’s trust, the media’s support and the power to carry out the reforms demanded of it. (1) White Papers are those which set out the government’s detailed pre-legislative proposals on specific topics. Green Papers are more consultative in nature, but not all consultation papers are published as Green Papers. Some departments issue large numbers of consultative papers, often on detailed aspects of policy. To list them exhaustively would obscure ministers’ political performance rather than illuminating it. Hence the papers listed as "Green" in Table 2 are those consultative papers examining matters of wider political significance. (2) For example: abolishing Assisted Places, holding referenda in Scotland and Wales prior to devolving power and releasing local authorities’ capital receipts. (3) It is not always possible to give practical effect to some of these promises, however. Point 7 of the introductory "contract", for example, pledges that New Labour "will help build strong families and strong communities, and lay the foundations of a modern welfare state in pensions and community care". "Strength" and "foundations" are subjective terms that will mean very different things depending on the perspective of the voter. Point 10 of the contract – "We will give Britain the leadership in Europe which Britain and Europe need" – is difficult to understand, let alone verify. (4) See Bob Franklin, Tough on soundbites, tough on the causes of soundbites, Catalyst Paper 3 (1998). (5) See Steve Platt, Government by task force, Catalyst Paper 2 (1998). (6) "Our policies include greater freedom for people to explore our open countryside. We will not, however, permit any abuse of a right to greater access" (Labour’s 1997 election manifesto, p. 30). (7) Ensuring that "decision-making on monetary policy is more effective, open, accountable and free from short-term political manipulation". (8) See Franklin, op cit. (9) See Platt, op cit. (10) See Franklin, op cit. (11) Although, of course, the measured performance of both in this case is adversely affected by the fact that their primary media audiences are in Scotland and Wales, rather than in the national press.
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